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Summary findings
Negotiations on trade in services at the World Trade  Using the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek framework, Mattoo
Organization (WTO) have so far produced little  and Olarreaga propose a negotiating formula that
liberalization beyond levels countries have undertaken  generalizes the fundamental WTO principle of
unilaterally. One reason: limited application of the  reciprocity to include alternative modes of delivery.
traditional negotiating principle of reciprocity.  Adoption of this formula as a basis for negotiations
In particular, participants have failed to exploit the  could bring greater commitments to liberalization on all
scope of the services agreement (GATS)  for the exchange  modes of delivery, producing substantial gains in global
of market-access "concessions" across different modes of  welfare and more balanced outcomes.
supply - cross-border delivery and the movement of
capital and workers.
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Reciprocity is a central principle governing WTO negotiations: one country reduces its
level of protection in return for a reciprocal reduction from its trading partner. While
reciprocity-based negotiations are widely credited with the substantial reduction in levels
of protection achieved in  goods trade, it is surprising that the relative neglect of the
principle has not conversely been seen as the reason for the disappointing results in two
areas:  negotiations  involving developing  countries and  those  on  trade  in  services.
Developing countries traditionally relied on the generosity of their trading partners for
market access (e.g. through the generalized system of preferences), and liberalized their
own markets either because of the realization that this made good economic sense or
under pressure from multilateral lending organizations.  Neither strategy has been entirely
successful: access to foreign markets in key areas like textiles and agriculture remains
blocked, and domestic reform often remains stalled.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) had a comprehensive structure. In
recognition of the fact that many services require proximity between consumers and
suppliers, the Agreement went beyond the traditional notion of trade  (including only
cross-border delivery) to encompass supply through the movement of both capital and
labor. In principle, there was scope for developed and developing countries to exploit
their  modal  comparative  advantage:  improved  access  for  capital  from  developed
countries  being  exchanged  for  improved  temporary  access  for  individual  service
providers fiom developing countries. In practice, there was little political will to improve
access for foreign individuals (except for the  limited class of  skilled intra-corporate
transferees), and a trade-off between modes of delivery simply did not take place.
This note argues that a more explicit and wider application of the principle of reciprocity
is needed to deliver greater liberalization and more balanced outcomes. In particular, the
application of the principle across the different modes of supply in services could help
break the political stalemate on the movement of individuals. The fact of severe shortages
of skilled labour in the US and the powerful constituency of high-technology companieslobbying for relaxation of visa limits makes this a propitious time to put labour mobility
squarely on the negotiating agenda.
Reciprocity in trade negotiations across modes of supply implies that the changes in
income associated with foreign factor flows (direct factor flows) and the changes in the
volume  of trade associated with cross-border trade (indirect factor trade) need to  be
equalized. If  reciprocity across modes of  supply is achieved, then the terms-of-trade
effect will also be neutralized, thus avoiding any international redistribution of income
associated with trade policy changes.
The formula we derive to  achieve reciprocity in trade negotiations across modes  of
supply has several practical applications. For instance, it can be used to calculate the level
of concessions in terms of temporary movement of persons that would be required to be
granted in exchange for concessions obtained with respect to other modes of supply. The
concessions in terms of personnel movements could be implemented through "foreign
labor content entitlements" provided to domestic firms.  These entitlements would be
global rather than bilateral, and firrns would be free to determine the extent and pattern of
use.  The  informational  requirements of  the  formula,  while  greater  than  those  in
conventional negotiations, are not difficult to meet.
21.  Introduction
Reciprocity  is a central  principle  governing  WTO negotiations:  one country  reduces its
level of protection  in return for a reciprocal  reduction  from its trading partner. This
emphasis  on achieving  a "balance  of (liberalizing)  concessions"  has led to the perception
of WTO  negotiations  as a mercantilist  process  driven  by political  forces  that nevertheless
leads to the desirable  outcome  of reduced levels of protection.  In an important  recent
paper, Bagwell and Staiger (1999) show that reciprocity  can be given a more direct
positive  economic  interpretation:  it serves  to neutralize  the adverse  terms of trade effects
associated with unilateral reductions in  protection, and therefore leads to  greater
liberalization.
While  reciprocity-based  negotiations  are widely  credited  with the substantial  reduction  in
levels of protection  achieved  in goods  trade,  it is surprising  that the relative  neglect  of the
principle  has not conversely  been seen as the reason for the disappointing  results  in two
areas: negotiations involving developing  countries and those on trade in  services.
Developing  countries  traditionally  relied  on the generosity  of their trading  partners for
market access (e.g. through  the generalized  system  of preferences),  and liberalized  their
own markets either because of the realization  that this made good economic  sense or
under  pressure  from  multilateral  lending  organizations.  Neither  strategy  has been entirely
successful:  access  to foreign  markets in key areas like textiles and agriculture  remains
blocked,  and  domestic  reform  often  remains  stalled.
The General Agreement  on Trade in Services (GATS)  had a deliberately  symmetric
structure. In recognition of the fact that many services require proximity between
consumers  and suppliers,  the Agreement  went beyond the traditional  notion of trade
(including  only cross-border  delivery)  to encompass  supply through  the movement  of
both capital and labor. In principle,  there was scope for developed  and developing
countries  to exploit  their  modal  comparative  advantage:  improved  access  for capital  from
developed  countries being exchanged  for improved temporary  access for individual
service  providers  from developing  countries.  In practice,  there was little political  will to
3improve access for  foreign individuals (except for the limited class of  skilled intra-
corporate transferees), and a trade-off between modes of delivery simply did not take
place.'  So the GATS  commitments reflect for the  most part  the  existing levels  of
unilaterally determined policy rather than liberalization achieved through a reciprocal
exchange of "concessions".
This note argues that a more explicit and wider application of the principle of reciprocity
is needed to deliver greater liberalization and more balanced outcomes. In particular, the
application of the principle across the different modes of supply in services could help
break the political stalemate on the movement of individuals. The fact of severe shortages
of skilled labour in the US and the powerful constituency of high-technology companies
lobbying for relaxation of visa limits makes this a propitious time to put labour mobility
on the negotiating agenda. 2 With developing countries increasingly opening up their
markets, the bargaining dynamic is changing and the prospects for serious inter-modal
trade-offs -such as obtaining labor movement in return for allowing greater commercial
presence for foreign service providers -are now greater.
Would it be desirable and feasible to create an institutional commitment to implement
such a reciprocity rule? Consider desirability first. Might it not be argued that most of the
gains from trade could be realized by providing for freedom to exchange products and it
is unnecessary to deepen WTO negotiations to cover factor movements? In the context of
many services for which cross-border delivery is not feasible, the movement of factors is
needed to make trade possible. And there can be little doubt that significant welfare gains
could be realized by allowing greater movement of capital and labor. Even in the case of
goods, trade alone  leads to  the equalization of  factor rewards only  under restrictive
assumptions, so there usually remains scope for further welfare gains by allowing factors
to move across borders. 3 Secondly, the scope for governments to increase the political
support for reform would be greater if the range of negotiating issues were widened.
Thus, it may be possible to  achieve more ambitious deals by creating links, not only
between the different modes, but also between trade in goods and trade in services.
4There are two aspects to the question of feasibility: political and technical. Would WTO
Members be willing to accept a rule which obliged them to exchange concessions across
modes, and in particular, to concede greater access to foreign individuals? First, at the
international level, there is a growing recognition of the need to achieve more balanced
outcomes  in  the  WTO  between  developing  and  developed countries, to  avoid the
polarization observed in  Seattle (Panagariya, 1999 and Hertel, Hoekman and Martin,
2000, Wang and Winters, 2000). There can be little doubt that meaningful negotiations
on the movements of individuals (mode 4) would enhance the engagement of developing
countries in the WTO system. Secondly, some of the political difficulties could also be
overcome by clarifying that liberalization is only with respect to temporary movement of
service suppliers, and does not imply migration. A clear distinction along these lines
should help alleviate some of the social and political fears associated with permanent
movements of persons.
But is it technically feasible to link concessions across modes? How is a tariff reduction
to be compared with greater access for investment or individuals? This note suggests a
formula through  which concessions across modes  and  sectors could be  linked. The
formula should be seen, not as something to be applied with extreme precision, but as a
rough rule-of-thumb to ensure a  certain balance of concessions. The reciprocity rule,
developed in  Section 2 ensures that the terms-of-trade effects of policy changes are
neutralized to  avoid international redistribution of income, as in Bagwell and Staiger
(1999). It  is  shown that  neutralization of terms-of-trade occurs when  reciprocity is
achieved across changes in  total  volumes of  factor trade,  both  direct  and  indirect.
Therefore, inter-modal reciprocity implies that the changes in income associated with
foreign  factor  flows  (direct factor  trade)  and  the  changes  in  the  volume  of  trade
associated with cross-border trade (indirect  factor trade) are equalized.
The informational requirements of the formula, while greater than those in conventional
negotiations, are not difficult to meet. The formula is developed in section 2. Examples of
how  the  formula  could be  applied, including  the  idea  of  "foreign  labour  content
5entitlements", are presented in section 3, where we also discuss practical other practical
considerations. Section 4 concludes.
2.  Reciprocity and neutralization of the terms of trade
Reciprocity for trade in goods can be seen to imply that any change in the import volume
associated with  a change in trade policy should be  matched by a  similar increase in
export volume (measured at initial world prices). 4 In a framework where direct factor
flows are also present, reciprocity must be defined across both changes in the volume of
trade in goods and changes in the income of factor movements across countries.
In order to derive an explicit reciprocity formula across goods and factor movements, let
us assume  for simplicity a  two-country world: the home country and the  rest-of-the
world.  Variables for the rest-of-the world will  be  indicated by  superscript "*".  The
current account of the home country is then given by:
p  X+.fD  =b  (b)
where  ""  stands for the  inner product of  the two  vectors; b  is  the current  account
balance; pw is a nxl  vector of world prices; x is a nx] vector of net exports of the home
country. Thus positive elements imply that the good is exported by the home country and
negative elements imply that the good is imported. fD  is a nxl vector of direct factor net
exports. Thus a positive entry implies that the home country is an exporter of that factor
to the rest of the world and a negative element implies that the factor is imported; c is a
combination of the nxl vector of factor prices in the home country and in the rest-of-the
world.5 It will be equal to the vector of the home country factor prices when the factor is
imported and equal to the vector of rest-of-the world factor prices when the factor is
exported. 6 That is c  = D,  w + (U - Dm.i )  w*, where U = diag(u) is a diagonal matrix of
the unit vector u;  Dm.=  is a diagonal matrix of the vector dm=l,  which takes the value 1
6when the factor is imported and 0 otherwise; wand we are the vectors of factor prices in
the home country and the rest-of-the world respectively.
Thus, the first element on the left-hand-side of (1) is the trade balance and the second
element is the balance of interest and other factor payments with the rest-of-the world.
Note that the current account may include other elements, such as grants, transfers and
gifts that we assume are not correlated with product and factor trade policy.
Following Vanek (1968), net exports can be written in terms of their factor content, i.e.,
xc  = A-lf,  where A  is a non-singular square matrix of input-output coefficients;  f  ' is
a vector of indirect net factor trade through trade in goods. Substituting into (1) and
totally differentiating (assuming no change in the current account balance) for changes in
goods or factor trade policy yields:
ApW .A'  f  + pw. A-'Af  +t.  Af  D  +  AO  fD  =0  (2)
where " A " stands for change. Note that for simplicity, and for the formula to be easily
applied, we assume that input-output coefficients are fixed (in each country), i.e., A,  is
not affected by changes in policies.
To obtain the relationship between world prices and factor prices, we assume without loss
of generality that tariffs are specific. 7 We also assume that the zero-profit condition holds
in the home country and in the rest-of-the world. In the service sector, specific tariffs
should be seen as simply reflecting the difference between world prices and the domestic
price. Thus,
w=Dm  AI(pW  +t)+(U-Dm  )A*-1(pw  +t*)
Aw  [Dm  A-'  + (u  - Din 1 )A- -]Ap W + Dm=A 1At  + (U  - D,=,)A*-At'
7where  I and t*  are  the  specific  tariffs in  the  home country and  rest-of-the  world,
respectively, and  A£is the matrix of input-output coefficients in the rest-of-the world.
Note that  we  assume no  reversal of the trade pattern  and therefore  Dn= 1 is  fixed.
Replacing (3) into (2) and rearranging yields:
Apw  [A-' (f  + Dm=ifD)+  (U - Dm=i)£A1fD]=  -[A-IpW  Af'  +
(Dmi]A-' (pw + t)+  (U-D.)A*-'(pw  + t.))  AfD  +  (4)
(D.=,A-'At  + (U - D.=)A'-'At*)-  fD]
The definition of reciprocity in the presence of direct and indirect factor movements
corresponds to the right-hand-side of equation (4). If the right-hand side of equation (4) is
equal to zero, then changes in indirect factor flows plus changes in income of direct
factor flows would have to be equalized, which we defined as reciprocity in the presence
of both indirect and direct factor flows. Note that this definition of reciprocity will also
imply that terms-of-trade are neutralized as the left-hand-side of (4) will then be equal to
zero. 8
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) implies reciprocity in terms of volume of trade
(measured at existing world prices). This will obviously not be enough to ensure terms-
of-trade neutrality in the presence of direct factor movements. The second term implies
reciprocity in terms of direct factor flows measured at existing domestic prices. The third
element implies reciprocity in terms of foreign factor income changes associated with
changes in policies. The idea is that in the presence of foreign factors, a change in trade
policy will affect the revenue of foreign factors in the domestic economy. As an example,
a tariff reduction in an import-competing sector will negatively affect the factor that is
intensively used  in  that  sector, which  in  the  presence  of  foreign  factors  leads  to
international  income redistribution  that needs to be neutralized. 9
Equation (4) shows that for reciprocity to neutralize the terms-of-trade effects (the only
economic rationale for non-cooperative bargaining or cooperative trade negotiations, as
convincingly argued  by  Bagwell and  Staiger,  1999), it  should  cover trade  in  both
8products and factors. Moreover, as argued before by linking negotiations across different
modes of supply, the set of possible outcomes of the negotiations expand and deals that
would have been impossible otherwise become feasible. Two examples of the use of (4)
to link negotiations across different modes of supply are explored in section 3.
Finally, note that the only assumptions required to obtained the formula in (4) is the zero-
profit condition, no reversal in trade-patterns and fix input-output coefficients. All these
assumptions could be relaxed to obtained a modified version of (4) if necessary.  ' 0
3.  Reciprocity formula for concessions across modes of supply
In this section, we show with two simple examples, how concessions across different
modes of supply can be linked by setting the right-hand side of equation (4) equal to zero.
The first example explores how concessions by one (developing) country in terms of
market access in goods trade can be compensated by opening access to  movement of
individuals (mode 4) by another (developed) country. The second example shows how
the formula can be used to compensate for openness to an increase in foreign ownership
in one service sector in a (developing) country, by again opening access to movement of
individuals in another (developed) country.
3.1  Exchanging goods market access for movements of individuals access
Assume that two countries, e.g., India and the US are negotiating over tariff reduction in
the automobile sector. Indian tariff in  1992 on vehicles was around 62 percent, whereas
the US  tariff on  automobiles was  close to 4  percent. There is very  little scope for
mutually beneficial reductions, regardless of the fact that India will probably not be
competitive in the US vehicle market. Our formula on the right-hand side of equation (4)
can then be used to  achieve reciprocity across sectors and different modes of supply.
Here we  explore the  possibility that  an  Indian tariff reduction  on  vehicles may be
compensated  by an opening of the US market to movement of persons (mode 4).
9Let us assume that the US would like India to reduce its tariffs so that India's imports of
vehicles from the US increase by 10 units. For simplicity let us also assume that there is
no presence of US factors of production (foreign investment, in particular) in India so
that we can neglect the third term on the right-hand side of equation (4), i.e. f  D=  0.
What should be the US market access concession in terms of movement of persons to
compensate India for its market access concession in the vehicles market of 10 units? The
answer to this question is obtained by setting the right-hand-side of (4) equal to zero and
solving for AfD =  [Al  D;AKD  ],  where AQD iS  the increase in exports of persons in India
to the US market and AKD  is the increase in exports of capital from India. We assume
that neither India nor the US is interested in access to the their partner's capital market,
and therefore set AK  D  =  0. Note that here the capital and labor changes are assumed to be
scalars, but they could easily be interpreted as vectors had we assumed different types of
labor and capital.
For the purpose of the example, normalize all units so that all world prices are initially
equal to 1. Then note that the first term on the right hand side of (4) is equal to 10, given
India's market access concession in the vehicle sector, i.e., A-lpw  Af'  =-10.  Using
(4), the US market access concession in terms of movements of persons is obtained by
solving:
(Dn=]A-1  (pw  + t))+  ((U-Dmi=  )A*- (pW + t*)). AfD  = 10  (5)
Recalling that  AKD  =  0, by assumption and that the diagonal element in D",  = 0 if the
factor (labor) is exported, one needs information on the input-output matrix and domestic
prices in the US, A*  and pw + t',  respectively, to solve for  ACD.  For the purpose of the
example, let us assume that the US  economy is composed of two sectors (vehicles,
denoted sector 1, and the rest of the economy, denoted sector 2) and as before two factors
of production are used, capital and labor. Thus:"
10[afl  a,,]  0.14  0.231  a  (6)
La, 2 aK,]2  0.15 0.33J  and  L  1.04i
Then solving (5) for AtD, using (6) yields:
AtD  =  10  10  = 0.5  (7)
I(aK 2P*  -a, 2P2)  O  (0.36 - 0.16)
IA*l  ~~~0.01
where  A*I  = aPlak 2 - aKlal 2 is the determninant  of  A*. Thus an increase of  10 units in
market access of India for US exporters of vehicles can be reciprocated by an increase of
0.5 units of labor from India to the US.
3.2  Exchanging foreign investment access for movement of individuals access
Assume India and the US are negotiating access on software services in the next round of
negotiations (and there is no other sector open to negotiations). For simplicitly, let us
assume that cross-border trade in software services is free of restrictions, which allows us
to drop the first term on the right-hand-side of (4) as concessions cannot be granted in
terns  of cross-border trade opening. But trade can also occur through the movement of
factors. Let us assume that the US negotiators require India to open its software market to
the entry of 10 units of US capital (which could be interpreted as concessions in terms of
entry  of  a  US  firm or  allowing for  US  ownership of Indian  software  firms), i.e.,
AKD =  -10.  Again, to simplify we assume no US factor presence initially in the Indian
market and drop the third term in equation (4). A sufficient condition for reciprocity and
neutralization of the terms-of-trade will be achieved, if the right-hand-side of equation (4)
is equal to zero, which given the above assumptions only requires the second term in (4)
to be zero. Thus,
(Dmi=A-'  (pW  + t))+ ((U - Dm=  )A--l ~w  +  t')).  AfD  =0  (8)
11Let us assume, for simplicity, that the input-output matrix is the same in India and the
US, i.e., A = A*, and that A*  is given by the matrix in equation (6). Recalling that tariffs
are zero in both countries and that units are chosen so that world prices are unit, and
further assuming there are no other non-tariff barriers, equation (8) becomes:
A-p  W Af  =  f  (a,2 -a,,  )AD  + I  (a.,  -a,  )X-10) = O  (9)
Solving (9) for  AeD yields:
Ml'=  lO(a,  -aej)  10(0.23-0.14)  5  (10)
a,  -a, 2 0.33-0.15
Thus a concession of India equivalent to the entry of 10 units of capital into the Indian
market can be reciprocated by an US concession in terms of entry of 5 units of Indian
labor.
3.3  Practical considerations
The previous sections have shown how the formula in equation (4) can be used to define
quantitatively reciprocity across different sectors and modes of supply. Notwithstanding
the mathematical detail, the formula is not difficult to apply. Data requirements are not
excessive, and  consist of world prices, tariffs (or tariff equivalents) and  input-output
tables in the negotiating partners. It should be possible to obtain at least crude estimates
of each variable. It is not our intention that the formula be applied in an extremely precise
manner. Rather we  seek to  suggest a mechanism that would ensure  a  certain rough
balance of concessions to satisfy the broad principle of reciprocity.
This paper has presented the negotiating formula using a two country model. However,
this does not imply the imposition of bilateral trade balancing conditions. Just as in the
12case of conventional negotiations on goods tariffs, the outcome of bilateral negotiations
would be multilateralised. This may be easier to accomplish when we are dealing with
tariff commitments rather than the quota-type commitments which would emerge from
negotiations involving factors. Nevertheless, it should be possible to allocate the quotas
on a non-discriminatory  basis. For instance, if US cross-border exports of services were
to  increase by a certain amount due to  changes in rest-of-the world policies, the US
would be required to provide domestic firms with "foreign labor entitlements" that would
allow them to hire foreign workers, on the basis of the formula derived earlier. These
entitlements could be calculated on a sectoral basis or on an aggregative basis - so that
foreign factors could be employed where they are most productive.
4.  Conclusions
In the services negotiations, developing countries have resisted the use of horizontal
formulae - preferring the use of a request and offer approach. This stems from defensive
considerations and a belief that they would be obliged to concede excessively high levels
of openness if a formula approach was adopted. We believe that this opposition is ill-
advised. A collective commitment  to the use of appropriately designed formula offers the
best  chance  of  linking  different  modes  of  delivery  and  extracting  meaningful
commitments on  the movement of  natural persons, the  mode  in  which  developing
countries have a comparative advantage.
Is the application of this formula likely to be politically feasible? We have said earlier
that given current shortages of labour in various markets, this is a propitious time to seek
liberalization commitments on this  mode. Establishing clear links between increased
exports  and  increased foreign labour content  entitlements may  also  help  make the
political case. The presence of foreign workers would be seen as a direct consequence of
increased opportunities for export abroad, and  also as  contributing to  the increased
competitiveness which makes it possible to exploit these opportunities. The link would be
most visible if the entitlements were calculated on a sectoral basis, i.e., increased exports
of software services lead to increased entitlements to employ foreign software engineers.
13But there may be scope for cross-sectoral trade-offs. And it may be desirable to make
these entitlements tradeable so as to ensure that foreign factors are employed where they
are most productive.
One undesirable aspect of an emphasis on reciprocity is that it creates the temptation to
hold back from unilateral liberalization. This is why most economists view reciprocity
with suspicion. In a companion piece, (Mattoo and Olarreaga, 2000) we have suggested
how this hold-back problem can be overcome by the creation of ex ante rules which
assure  that  credit  would  be  given for  unilateral  liberalization in  future  rounds  of
negotiations. The impulse to liberalize unilaterally then need not be inhibited by the fear
of loss of negotiating coinage.
The narrowest application of our formula would be across modes of supply within the
services sectors alone. A somewhat wider use would be also to include cross-border trade
in goods. This domain would correspond to the current coverage of WTO rules. The
widest application would extend to the movement of factors involved in goods production
also. In a sense, there is a strange asymmetry in the current WTO structure, which the
creation  of  rules  for  investment  in  goods  would  partially  remedy.  The  existing
commitments on the movement of individuals also have a curious aspect: in principle,
they  cover the  movement of  individuals to  work in  the production of  services like
banking, but not the production of goods like cars, but in practice it may be impossible to
make such a distinction. For instance, when the US allows Indian software engineers to
seek employment in the US market, it does not prevent them from working in the car
industry.
One argument  for widening the negotiating domain is that  it offers more  scope for
overcoming  domestic political  economy constraints and  hence  more  scope  for  an
exchange of liberalizing concessions. If a truly general framework of negotiations on
trade in products and factors were established, our formula would offer a meaningful
basis for the exchange of concessions.
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16Endnotes
The "single-undertaking" approach of the Uruguay Round also provided some scope for
inter-modal concessions, but did little to influence commitments on the movements of
persons. Single-undertaking  implied that members could not pick and choose agreements,
but had to accept the entire Uruguay Round package.
2 See the recent paper by Masters and Ruthizer (2000) or Bill Gates' recent testimony
before congress arguing for allowing  more software engineers to enter the US labor
market.
3 In the goods context, trade in goods is a substitute  for trade in factors in the standard
Hecksher-Ohlin framework but once we relax the assumptions of this model, and allow,
for instance, for increasing returns to scale, trade in goods and factors may well be
complementary  (see Markusen, 1983).
4 For a discussion of reciprocity along these lines see Dam (1970), Bhagwati (1991) and
Bagwell and Staiger (1999).
5 Note that by assuming that foreign factors receive the complete domestic factor price,
we implicitly assume that there are no friction associated with factor movement. In a
frictionless world, factor price differences can only exist in the presence of barriers to
factor movements.
6Here  we implicitly assume that the same factor cannot be imported and exported at the
same time. To make this consistent with two-way factor flows, one can imagine
disaggregating the vector of direct factor flows not only by type, but also by direction of
flow.
7 To assume ad-valorem  tariff will not change our main results.
178 As in Bagwell and Staiger (1999) this is a sufficient though not necessary condition for
terms-of-trade to be neutralized. For empirical evidence that terms-of-trade may matter in
"small" developing countries see Chang and Winters (1999).
9 The neutralization of this type of international redistribution of income ensures that the
concessions are also mutually beneficial. In the absence of such neutralization, one of the
trading partners may loose from the deal, along the lines explored by Brecher and Diaz-
Alejandro (1977).
10  Note that the changes in factor and goods flows are taken as exogenous here, where in
reality a change in direct factor flows may affect trade in goods. However, we abstract
from these effects since we are not interested in "general equilibrium effects" due to
changes in one particular policy but in changes in policies across countries that
correspond to the notion of reciprocity in terms of market access. Also to apply the
formula some elasticity will be needed to calculate the effect that the change in policy
(that governments control) has on factor flows (direct and indirect).
l  l  The input output coefficient are calculated by taken the share of labor payments and
capital payments in total output for the transport sector of the United states for sector 1
and for the whole manufacturing in sector 2. Data is from Unido and corresponds to the
year 1997.
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